Political Economy of Elder Financial Exploitation

Political Economy of Elder Financial Exploitation

Nicholas Djoulia

May 2026

Abstract

Since the dawn of the digital age, financial fraud targeting senior citizens has been one of the most significant yet underrepresented economic and political issues in American life. In 2024 alone, $81.5 billion was lost, with a potential $137 billion when accounting for underestimation. With these figures, elder financial exploitation (EFE) has shifted from small-scale, individual risks to systemic economic risks, posing a significant threat to our financial institutions. This paper delves into the fact that EFE must be reframed as a broad market failure accelerated by the main drivers: the concentration of wealth in a technologically vulnerable generation, deception of this generation through artificial intelligence (AI), and the lack of a regulatory framework that is constitutionally sound and able to combat the harm being done; this is a full shift away from the issue being framed as a financial literacy problem that can be quickly amended through a change in curricula for elders. Through neuropsychological research on vulnerability cognitively, macroeconomic analysis of wealth distribution and aging, FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) Bank Secrecy Act implementation data, behavioral economics of fraud, and regulatory fragmentation, the paper explores the issue of elder fraud online through a multi-factor approach, even with a growing awareness of the issue. The paper will analyze the regulatory framework governing EFE, evaluate pending legislation, and identify the key government issues that must be resolved for reform to be possible.

1. Introduction

Imagine receiving a call from your grandchild. They had just been in a car accident and needed money to cover the repairs, but were too afraid to ask their parents. They sounded just like they always had, kind and patient, and they had always been honest with you. You rushed towards your computer and immediately wired the money. A few days later, you called your grandchild, and you discovered that the car accident did not, in fact, happen. That is when you discovered that you had been taken advantage of financially by an online scammer, who used AI to generate your grandchild’s voice, utilizing a clip from their Snapchat story. You had just joined thousands of people your age who had been financially scammed online.

For many, this is not a made-up scenario. This is a real phenomenon and a real method used by scammers to steal elders’ wealth; note that this is a fairly new occurrence in the online world. For most of the digital age, EFE occurred on a small scale, and it was therefore containable through law enforcement and regulatory frameworks. Scammers would send bulk phishing emails filled with spelling errors, posing as Middle Eastern princes, and target older individuals with limited technology experience. However, around 2022, generative AI completely altered the landscape of online scams. Committing fraud online became cheaper and easier, and many scammers framed their actions as legitimate communication. The overall result was a crisis that governments and law enforcement, through now-outdated regulatory and policy frameworks, were unable to handle properly. 

With $81.5 billion being lost to online scams in 2024 alone for Americans over 60, a number that could be as high as $137 billion, taking into account underestimates (FTC, 2025), that figure is directly comparable to the GDPs of entire countries. That figure is directly comparable to that of the GDPs of entire countries. However, the real problem is that the response to this issue has been slow in terms of regulatory action and policy initiatives, even though advocacy campaigns and gradual BSA (Bank Secrecy Act - Focuses on anti-money laundering) amendments have been implemented. Focuses on anti-money laundering) Amendments have been implemented. 

Taking into account the scale of this issue, the central argument of this paper is that the misalignment between the EFE problem and response is not a political failure, but a failure to understand the issue in today’s political economy properly. EFE is still being treated as an issue of individual consumers that could be fixed with changes to financial literacy curricula. This paper argues that this issue is an inherent and systemic market failure driven by the accumulation of elders’ wealth, the growth of AI-fueled scamming mechanisms, and an aging regulatory framework that is too uncoordinated to address it on a broad scale properly. Understanding this updated identification is the right approach to creating the policy necessary to prompt meaningful change eventually.

II. The Economics of an Aging America

1. Wealth Concentration and the Longevity Transition

To understand why EFE has festered into a systematic market issue, it is crucial first to understand where people’s wealth is concentrated. Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954) life cycle hypothesis posits that people save money during their working years and access that money to spend during their retirement. The result of this hypothesis is that wealth accumulation peaks for most just before retirement, and, as a result, most of the wealth in the US population is held by older adults. According to the WPP 2022 report, the share of the global population aged 65 and over is set to increase from 10% to 16% by 2050 (UN DESA, 2022). In the US only, the ratio of retirees to working people is set to rise from 28.5% in 2025 to nearly 38% by 2050 (McKinsey & Co., 2026). 

This is not just a small shift within the population; it is a massive economic one. As Baby Boomers continue to age and retire, the nation's wealth and assets rest in the hands of older Americans. This is what many are calling the Great Wealth Transfer. By 2040, 22% of the US population will be in their 60s, approaching retirement age, a significant increase from 12% in 2005 (PLANADVISER, 2026). Economist Kim (2025) finds that wealthier retirees continue to save and accumulate wealth even after retirement, meaning that the concentration of wealth in this demographic is likely far greater than estimates and economic models suggest. What all of this means is that there has never been a time when so much of the nation’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of older generations. Those generations are being forced to connect with an increasingly digital world that they did not have access to growing up. 

2. What Fraud Actually Costs the Economy

When fraud dislocates funds from elders, they are not transferred and tracked as they would be with bank transfers; instead, these funds mostly disappear from the domestic economy. Fraudulent funds, often funneled to transnational criminal organizations, are routed overseas through offshore accounts and cryptocurrency exchanges, thereby permanently removed from domestic economic cycles. Applying Keynesian economics to this situation, removing $81.5 billion annually from the spending budgets of older Americans has significant impacts on the healthcare, housing, and service sectors of the economy that depend on elder consumer spending.

In addition to the effects on specific individuals and economic sectors, there is a major fiscal impact, as senior citizens' savings decrease due to fraud, while applications for Medicaid, housing, and Supplemental Security Income increase, thereby placing a greater financial burden on the government to aid this population. Notably, converting private losses into government expenditures without raising tax revenue is a fiscal nightmare for both state and federal governments (AARP Public Policy Institute, 2023). The majority of EFE loss data is based solely on direct financial harm to seniors, not on the broader economic and regulatory impacts. The AARP (2023) conservatively estimates that annual direct losses to elderly Americans from online fraud are $28.3 billion. The number balloons much higher, accounting for the true welfare cost of online fraud, including increased government spending and strain on Medicare and Medicaid.

3. How Compliance Costs Are Reshaping Banking

EFE is causing negative institutional impacts in the banking sector, thereby increasing financial risk for seniors. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, FinCEN receives over 155,000 reports related to EFE annually, with approximately $27 billion in suspicious activity. The record $1.3 billion penalty against TD Bank for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) failures in 2024 prompted institutions to increase spending to combat this (FinCEN, 2024b). This financial burden falls primarily on small banks. 

Small banks have historically been best at combating EFE through strong community ties, rather than through complex online safeguards. Local bank employees who notice unusual activity in an elder's account would likely recognize that the elder was being scammed and financially taken advantage of. By regulation, expensive, algorithm-based compliance requirements are imposed on the banking sector to prevent fraud, exacerbating the issue and leading to financial uncertainty for elders,, as smaller banks are no longer able to accommodate their needs due to the decline of human-driven fraud detection.

III. How AI Changed Elder Fraud

1. From Phishing Emails to Precision Targeting

The fraud game has been disrupted by technological advancement, impeding the ability of existing infrastructure to combat the issue. For most of the digital age, elder fraud was committed through mass, uncoordinated efforts. Scammers would send thousands of phishing emails to seniors, with slim hopes of a response, but these letters were poorly written and easy for many to detect. However, this trend in online financial scams has been effectively curbed by AI. Since late 2022, generative AI has been used to create deepfake phone calls, increasingly realistic emails, and tech support pop-ups. Scammers access senior citizens’ financial data by building “credible” connections with vulnerable seniors through generative AI (Blackbird.AI, 2025).

The data reflects this phenomenon. Cryptocurrency wallets linked to scam activity gained $9.9 billion in 2024, a figure bound to grow. By 2025, total scam-related crypto losses were estimated at $17 billion, with deepfake and impersonation scams growing 1,400% from the previous year. Per victim, average payments grew from $782 to $2,764, a 253% increase (Chainalysis, 2025; 2026). This shows AI’s growing capabilities in maintaining connections with senior-citizen victims before protective services can spot fraud (Chainalysis, 2025; 2026). A particular AI-powered scam method, deepfakes, grew from 500,000 reported cases in 2023 to over 8 million in 2025 (Resemble AI, 2025). With voice cloning, particularly of family members or government officials, online requiring 3 seconds of audio, deepfakes are a highly dangerous and financially concerning scam technique that is concerning for governments, who mostly have ineffective and outdated governmental regulations to tackle the issue.

2. Pig-Butchering: Patience as a Fraud Strategy

The most significant and growing AI-powered scam technique used in EFE is no longer just deepfakes; it now includes the pig-butchering scheme, also classified as a romance scam. Deriving its name from inhumanely fattening up animals before slaughter, these scams work by scammers spending days and weeks establishing connections and relationships with seniors through social media and messaging apps. Scammers eventually lead unsuspecting seniors to fraudulent investment opportunities, primarily in cryptocurrency, from which they can extract funds. In contrast with traditional online scam methods, the pig-butchering technique is slow-moving and emotionally driven, taking advantage of seniors' loneliness towards the end of their lives (DeLiema, 2018). Scammers take advantage of the fact that seniors may experience loneliness towards the end of their lives and are therefore more likely to enter online “relationships” with scammers (DeLiema, 2018). 

The financial scale of this problem is extraordinary and frightening. The University of Texas’ study of blockchain transactions found that pig-butchering networks displaced $75 billion of senior-citizen wealth into faulty crypto investments over 4 years, between 2020 and 2024 (Griffin & Mei, 2024). Many of these transactions are facilitated by Organized and Transnational crime organizations using cheap and trafficked labor from Asia. This means that EFE and human trafficking are innately interlinked, and that ignoring one negatively impacts the other (INTERPOL, 2025). From an international perspective, domestic regulatory action is largely unable to solve this problem. 

3. The Double-Edged Sword of AI Governance 

At the center of the AI-era fraud policy is the fact that AI-powered countermeasures, including LLMs and deepfakes, counter AI-powered scams. Regulatory efforts that use AI-powered detection methods to restrict AI-powered scams can have a positive impact on scammers themselves while undermining overall defense efforts. Regulatory efforts do not bind criminal networks and organized crime groups, but a bank’s detection systems do. This means that AI regulatory policy can backfire on regulators, inhibiting the efforts of entities that protect against scams and giving scammers an undue advantage.

IV. Why Senior Citizens Are Structurally Vulnerable

1. What the Brain Science Shows

Seniors' vulnerability to financial fraud is not a matter of a lack of care or attention to detail. It can be rooted in biology. As research shows, older adults experience a steady cognitive decline, with thinning of brain structures that help regulate how we process and respond to threats (Fenton et al., 2022). This biological phenomenon predisposes seniors to vulnerability in the digital age.

In terms of policy implications, timing is crucial. Work studied by Nicholas (2021) uncovered that people with a later diagnosis of Alzheimer’s missed bill payments around 6 years before their diagnosis, and as a result suffered credit declines about 2.5 years before their diagnosis. This shows that EFE vulnerability can be directly linked to declines in cognitive capacity, memory, and executive functioning in older adults, before any formal diagnosis or treatment. This means that regulators and governments, on a systemic level, need to implement safeguards for older adults, not just for individuals aged 65 and above, to combat the decline in cognitive ability early on, and therefore help these individuals be better protected against online financial scams.

2. Social Isolation and the Trust Trap

Social developments and societal circumstances shape cognitive vulnerability in older adults. In many societies, it is common for older adults to face increased isolation and loneliness, and therefore can face conditions such as depression and MCI (Mild Cognitive Impairment). DeLiema (2018) links this to EFE, where scammers target vulnerable individuals. Mixed with technological advancements and shrinking social connections, the risk of exploitation rises.

The identity of the fraudster further complicates the full picture. FinCEN (2024a) shows 40% of exploitation involves trusted relationships, often with family members. Betrayal trauma theory can therefore be linked to this to explain why this form of EFE is unexpected and greatly damaging: through trusted individuals, caregivers, and relatives exploiting seniors, greater financial harm is induced, and psychological welfare is more damaged than if the senior had suffered scams at the hands of a stranger. The cognitive mechanism people use to function in relationships has a difficult time identifying and accepting instances of abuse in close relationships, and this further worsens the psychological and subsequent financial effects of this form of exploitation. The institutional deficiency is that standard regulatory action and fraud awareness campaigns ignore this form of scam, posing a greater risk to victims. 

3. Why Financial Education is Not Enough

The instinct of many is to address this deep-rooted issue regarding EFE by enhancing financial literacy programs to teach about it. However, the evidence does not support this method as a practical and effective policy solution. Research has shown that financial knowledge and aptitude do not reduce the risk of online financial scams; social advocacy and support for seniors is far more effective to help not only prevent financial loss but also protect their cognitive welfare in the long run, as we see solutions, contrary to the belief of some, are not posited by financial literacy programs (Gotelaere & Paoli, 2022; Button & Cross, 2017; Cross & Kelly, 2016; Prenzler, 2020). 

Han’s (2023) model of EFE provides substantial and explanatory support for the view that changes in financial literacy do not affect EFE: EFE is directly linked to biopsychosocial developments, including neurological and interpersonal factors, with financial literacy interventions only able to remedy a small fraction of the underlying causes of the broader issue. Direct financial literacy and education on basic scamming techniques would have worked 10 years ago, but not in the age of AI. Personalized AI-driven techniques are more prevalent than traditional scams. Emotional capacity is more active and stable, given the market-specific nature of financial literacy.

V. The Regulatory Landscape and Where It Falls Short

1. Too Many Agencies, No Clear Leader

In the US, regulatory action against EFE falls short. Despite rising budgets and debt, there is no regulatory agency to combat EFE. Jurisdiction is spread across state and federal entities, with no coordinated effort. FinCEN fulfills the Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements; the CFPB regulates financial products; the SEC connects BSA elements to financial advisors; the FTC prosecutes fraud; states handle criminal crackdowns; and Adult Protective Services addresses social issues. The agencies of the FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, CFPB, FinCEN, and state entities acknowledged the problematic nature of enforcing a coordinated effort to combat EFE. The agencies acknowledged the problematic nature of coordinating enforcement but failed to establish an enforcement policy (Interagency Statement on EFE, 2024). This shows the inherent weakness of the current system in coordinating efforts to counter EFE.

2. The BSA’s Blind Spot

Under the BSA (Bank Secrecy Act), the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) system serves as the primary systemic protection against EFE. However, a significant problem is that this system was not engineered to address the problem it is now tasked with. SAR serves to identify unusual transactions within accounts, such as large-sum wire transfers to new entities. This method is effective for identifying outbound scamming activities. For trusted relationship transactions that are exploitive, this approach fails. For example, a daughter of an older adult transfers funds out of her mother's account. This looks fine on paper, and that is where the SAR's deficiency lies. FinCEN (2024a) reported that 80% of EFE BSA filings involve outbound scamming efforts, while only 20% involve trusted relationship scams. The SAR efforts neglect this classification of scams, unable to serve 20% of victims. This truly reflects the limitations of current systems in preventing and limiting the impacts of EFE across all cases. 

3. The Financial Exploitation Prevention Act

In the wake of the uncoordinated regulatory response from state and federal governments, the most effective legislative response to EFE is the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act (H.R. 2478 and S. 2840). The Financial Exploitation Prevention Act (H.R. 2478 and S. 2840) would allow financial institutions to redeem funds lost by elder consumers to EFE and halt financial transactions deemed unusual. As of 2026, the Senate version of this legislation is still in the works, with the House having passed the bill in 2024. Even with this legislative delay in the federal government, the bill's concept is promising: prevent the negative financial effects of EFE by reimbursing seniors and preventing funds from leaving the domestic economy.

However, the bill's legalities are still being hashed out, for good reason. However, the bill interferes with the right of consenting adults to have full control over their finances and lacks sufficient clarity on what "suspicious activity" means. Also, it lacks sufficient clarity about what “suspicious activity” means, with no clear way to standardize its identification. 

4. The International Problem

 A large share of the damage caused by EFE is attributable to international organizations and individuals. Many major scamming methods are carried out using outsourced labor. The root of this international problem is that US authorities lack jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these crimes. Focusing on the major crypto issue, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has only 40 countries in compliance. Laundering standards leave many exchanges and cryptocurrencies without proper monitoring and regulation by authorities. Therefore, to address this international issue with EFE, international cooperation and treaties are needed to halt its international sources.

VI. Key Governance Tensions and the Path Forward

1. Five Tensions That Must Be Resolved

Building on the earlier optimistic sentiment about resolving the EFE issue, the organization needs to address the 5 core issues that underlie the broader concept. 

Autonomy vs. Protection- One of the major issues in combating EFE is whether to interfere with senior citizens' freedom of choice to protect them from fraud, or leave them to their own devices when making decisions. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) proposed a middle ground using "nudge theory" to offer seniors a protective service, provided by the government or healthcare providers, that they could opt out of if necessary. In this theory, third-party accounts could monitor protective arrangements contracted by the government while giving seniors complete autonomy to opt out if they choose. This gives seniors the peace of mind that comes with protection, if they choose it, and individual freedom if they feel their personal decision-making is being intruded upon. However, disability advocates oppose a default protection system for seniors, claiming it indirectly classifies them as incompetent, creating systemic prejudice. 

Privacy vs surveillance: With fraud, especially in the AI era, it typically goes under the radar until after the financial harm has already been done, when it is uncovered. This leads authorities to want to detect fraud before it occurs, which would require monitoring elders’ financial behavior and tracking their transactions. Though this might seem like a feasible way to stop fraud before it happens, this raises major privacy concerns. There is the concern that the wrong people could gain access to the elder’s data. Who is responsible for monitoring accounts that freeze due to suspicious activity? These questions have no clear answers, given the ambiguity in regulatory policy. The Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States (2018) made the issue even more complex.

Compliance Costs vs. Financial Inclusion: The cost of compliance, including government regulations, increases banks' expenses when serving senior citizens. If compliance costs continue to grow, banks may reduce services for seniors, forcing them to store money in prepaid cards, wire services, and the crypto market. More regulation could leave seniors more exposed, worsening the issue.

Compliance regulation can create harm for seniors rather than help them, similar to the issue of AI governance. As AI restrictions continue to be enforced and strengthened, this can inhibit defense mechanisms more than they do offensive systems from combating online fraud. On the other hand, if applied too loosely, there would be a lack of regulation protection against AI-powered scamming activity, leaving seniors vulnerable to EFE, yet again, a poor outcome. A compromise between heavy and light enforcement is needed, with a clear link between regulatory policy and AI crucial for success.

Measurement and evidence: The disparity between estimated and confirmed losses ($10 billion and $137 billion, respectively) shows an issue with policy and implementation. Effective regulation yields accurate data. The decentralized enforcement of EFE across state and federal entities results in uncoordinated, disorganized data collection. This disparity in the data, and the fact that self-reporting is extremely common, reform the data analysis process on EFE. Using FTC data, FinCEN filings, healthcare data, and credit bureau data can provide a more accurate measure of EFE.

2. What Needs to Happen Next

Settling these issues requires more effective action than advocacy campaigns and reporting requirements. It demands a change in the regulatory landscape to aid seniors for the greater good. This kind of issue needs federal investment and institutional change, not just uncoordinated action among states or local counties.

Based on economic and public policy research, several priorities for implementing this change are clear. Economists need to model the fiscal effects of EFE, situating it within the aggregate market. Public policy researchers need to examine policy at both federal and state levels, evaluating what is most effective in preventing EFE without increasingg compliance costs. Regulators and government officials need to determine whether EFE falls under federal or state jurisdiction, and who should have clear authority to enforce regulatory policy. This would help address the serious issue of conflicting authority between local and federal entities in regulating EFE-related issues.

VII. Conclusion

The issue of EFE is not a small-scale matter revolving around seniors' cognitive capacity and ability to resist scams individually. It is a systemic market and regulatory failure, suffocating a generation of older adults due to the rise of generative AI, ineffective regulatory efforts, and an uncoordinated response. 

Research into the biology of EFE explains individual harm; economic research shows broad economic losses; and regulatory analysis shows that existing policy and infrastructure require drastic reform. Synthesizing these perspectives, it is clear that EFE is a systemic issue, not an individual one that can be fixed through financial literacy.

The conflicts in efforts to remedy EFE, involving autonomy and protection, privacy and surveillance, compliance and inclusion, AI offense and defense, and measurement and policy, are in desperate need of reform and revision at both national and international levels. They are not obstacles that authorities should avoid and let fester, as they have done in the past. Regulators, government officials, economists, and public policy experts can collaborate to help seniors secure financial security and independence in the ever-changing digital age.

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